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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KELLY GATES, SR, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
and GEORGE M. ANDERSON, 
Respondent, 
CaseNo.20010934-CA 
Priority No. 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
GEORGE M. ANDERSON 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commissioner's 
determination that Petitioner George Anderson's work related injuries entitle him to 
medical, temporary total, and permanent partial disability benefits. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) 
(a) (1953, as amended) and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (8) (1997). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Whether the brief of Kelly Gates, Sr. should be considered by this 
Court where the brief fails to marshal the evidence against Gates, fails to appropriately 
cite to the record or case law, provides little legal analysis, does not contain the required 
addendum, and misrepresents the record? 
Standard of Appellate Review: "To effectively challenge the Board's findings of 
fact, a party must marshal 'all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence.'" Merriam v. Board of Review 812 P.2d 447, 
450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 68); 
accord Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 843-4 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
"'[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). 
Furthermore, "[i]t is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an 
argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305, 313 (Utah 1998); See also State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 414 (Utah 1993); State 
v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984). 
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Preservation for Appeal: This issue arose on appeal to this Court and, as such, 
there was no need for preservation of the issue in the administrative proceeding. 
Issue No. 2: Whether there is substantial evidence to support the Labor 
Commission's finding that Kelly Gates, Sr. was Anderson's employer where Anderson 
testified he was hired by Gates, used Gates' tools, was subject to the control of Gates, 
and all of Anderson's paychecks were drawn on Gates' business account? 
Standard of Appellate Review: This Court's review of the Labor Commission's 
findings of fact is governed by §63-46b-l-16(4)(g) (1997) of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA). Under UAPA, the Labor Commission's findings of fact will be 
affirmed if they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court." Merriam v. Board of Review 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board ofReviewy 116 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)). "Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person 'might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 
776 P.2d at 68). "It is not [the court's] prerogative on review to reweigh the evidence. 
Instead, [the court] defer[s] to the Commission's findings because, when reasonably 
conflicting views arise, it is the Commission's province to draw inferences and resolve 
these conflicts." Id. (quoting Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 83, 68 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1993)). 
Preservation for Appeal: This issue was arguably never preserved for appeal. 
Indeed, in setting forth the four issues in his brief, Gates does not indicate, in violation of 
3 
Rule 24, where he had preserved any of those alleged issues. 
Issue No. 3: Whether Anderson is entitled to an award of attorney fees where 
Gates' brief, misrepresents the facts, refers to evidence which was "doctored", fails to 
follow a majority of the requirements of Rule 24, and appears to be brought for the sole 
purpose of delay? 
Standard of Appellate Review: "An appeal that is frivolous is one that is cnot 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law.' Utah R. App. P. 33(b); See, Hunt v. Hurst, 785 
P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990). 
Preservation for Appeal: This issue arose on appeal to this Court and, as such, 
there was no need for preservation of the issue in the administrative proceeding. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 24 is the applicable rule regarding the sufficiency of briefs and is 
attached in full at Addendum "A". UTAH CODE ANN. §63-46b-16 is the applicable statute 
regarding appeals from administrative actions and is attached in full at Addendum "B". 
Utah R. App. P. 33 is the applicable rule regarding frivolous appeals and is attached in 
full at Addendum "C". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Kelly Gates, Sr. seeks review of the Labor Commission's 
final order awarding workers' compensation benefits to Respondent, George Michael 
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Anderson, for injuries he sustained while working for the employer, Kelly Gates, Sr. dba 
Kelly Gates Enterprises. 
Course of the Proceedings: On August 27, 1997, Anderson filed an Application 
for Hearing with the Labor Commission of Utah alleging entitlement to benefits for 
medical expenses, temporary total compensation, and permanent partial disability 
compensation as a result of injuries sustained on January 17, 1996, while working as a 
framer for Kelly Gates, Sr. building a home in Diamond Valley, Utah. (Rl at 5). 
The Labor Commission held a hearing in St. George, Utah, on July 1, 1999. (R3 at 
1). The Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on January 19, 2001, finding that Kelly Gates, Sr. was not the employer of 
Anderson and dismissed Anderson's claim for workers' compensation benefits. (R2 at 
356-61). A copy of said order is attached hereto as Addendum "D". 
Anderson filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission on February 19, 
2001. (R. 2 at 364-71). The Motion for Review was granted by the Labor Commission 
on June 28, 2001, remanding the case to the Administrative Law Judge for a 
determination as to the amounts owed Anderson for temporary total disability benefits, 
medical expenses and permanent partial disability. (R2 at 410-14). A copy of the 
Commission's order is attached hereto as Addendum "E". On July 30, 2001, the ALJ 
entered an Order on Remand awarding temporary total disability, permanent partial 
disability, and medical benefits to Anderson. (R2 at 420-2). A copy of the ALJ's order is 
attached hereto as Addendum "F". 
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On August 29, 2001, Gates filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission. 
(R2 at 423-47). On November 15, 2001, the Labor Commission issued an Order Denying 
Gates' Motion for Review. (R2 at 459-61). A copy of the Commission's order is attached 
hereto as Addendum "G". On November 28, 2001, Gates filed a Petition for Review with 
the Utah Court of Appeals. (R2 at 462-3). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In its Order Grating Motion for Review, the Labor Commission found as 
follows: 
a. On January 17, 1996, Mr. Anderson was working as a carpenter, 
framing a residence to be occupied by Kelly Gates, Jr. ("Junior" 
hereafter). As Anderson cut a metal band holding a stack of lumber, 
the metal band snapped and cut his wrist. Surgery was required to 
repair the injury. Anderson was unable to work for a period of time 
after the accident; he also have suffered permanent impairment. (R2 
at 410; See also, Addendum "E" at 1). 
b. Anderson contends he was employed by Junior's father, Kelly Gates, 
Sr. ("Senior" hereafter) at the time of his accident, and that Senior is 
liable for his workers' compensation benefits. In response, Senior 
argues that Anderson was employed by Junior at the time of 
Anderson's accident. Senior further argues that, because Anderson 
was employed by Junior in the construction of Junior's own 
residence, Anderson is excluded from coverage under the workers' 
compensation system by §34A-2-103(6)(b) of the act. (R2 at 410; 
See also Addendum "E" at 1). 
c. It is undisputed that Anderson's injuries resulted from a work-related 
accident on January 17, 1996. It is also undisputed that Anderson 
was an employee, rather than an independent contractor, at the time 
of the accident. To determine whether Anderson was employed by 
Junior or Senior, it is necessary to review the circumstances and 
context of Anderson's work and his relationships with Senior and 
Junior. (R2 at 411; See also Addendum "E" at 2). 
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d. Senior is a businessman in the St. George area. In the past, he owned 
and operated an auto dealership in St. George, by the time of the 
hearing in this matter, he had formed another automobile business, 
this time with Junior, his son. Under the business name of "Kelly 
Gates Enterprises," Senior owns rental units, condominiums, and 
town homes. He was also a principal in the development of a 
residential subdivision known as Diamond Ranches, located about 
15 miles from St. George. Senior gave Junior a residential building 
lot in the Diamond Ranch subdivision. It was at this lot, in the 
course of the construction of Junior's residence, that Anderson was 
injured. (R2 at 411; See also Addendum "E" at 2). 
e. At the time of Anderson's accident, Junior was 22 years old. He had 
little or no experience with building or construction. He was 
employed on a full-time basis as an assistant manager at a grocery 
store and also worked 30 hours a week as a salesman at a local car 
dealership, both in St. George. (R2 at 411; See also Addendum "E" 
at 2). 
f. In November, 1995, Senior hired Anderson to work on a cabin 
Senior was building for his personal use in the Kolob Canyon area 
north of St. George. Shortly thereafter, Senior also hired Anderson 
and several other workers to remodel two storage units located in St. 
George into business offices. At the time as the storage units were 
being remodeled, Anderson and the other workers began 
construction of Junior's residence in Diamond Ranch, where 
Anderson suffered his injury on January 17, 1996. (R2 at 411; See 
also Addendum "E" at page 2). 
g. The parties do not substantially dispute the foregoing facts. 
However, the parties tell very different versions of the remaining 
facts. Before the Commission sets out its findings on these disputed 
issues, some general comments are in order regarding the relative 
credibility of the parties. (R2 at 411; See also Addendum "E" at 2). 
h. The ALJ discounted Anderson's testimony, in part, because of his 
economic self-interest in obtaining workers' compensation benefits. 
But Senior, who has no workers' compensation insurance, has an 
equivalent economic interest in avoiding payment of such benefits. 
Consequently, economic interest does not provide a means of 
judging the relative credibility of Anderson and Senior. (R2 at 411; 
See also Addendum "E" at 2). 
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The ALJ also discounted Anderson's testimony on the grounds it 
was contradicted by the testimony of all other witnesses. However, 
after careful review of Anderson's testimony, the Commission finds 
such testimony to be responsive, simple, and straight-forward. 
Furthermore, Anderson's testimony does not conflict with the 
testimony of Mr. Hoskins, the only disinterested individual to testify 
in this matter. (R2 at 412; See also Addendum "E" at 3). 
The Commission has also carefully review the testimony of Senior 
and Junior and finds it to be equivocal and inconsistent. 
Furthermore, Senior and Junior admit to conduct that undermines 
their general credibility. For example, Senior asked Mr. Hoskins, a 
construction contractor, to turn in Anderson's injury as a claim 
against Hoskins' workers' compensation insurance policy. Such a 
claim would have been fraudulent. To his credit, Mr. Hoskins 
refused Senior's request. As another example, even in their project 
to remodel storage units, where Senior admits to being Anderson's 
employer, Senior failed to comply with state and federal laws 
requiring withholding of income tax, payment of FICA tax, 
unemployment insurance contributions, and obtaining workers' 
compensation coverage. Finally, Junior admits that he submitted 
false information to his construction lender in order to obtain funds 
to pay Anderson's medical expenses. The foregoing conduct 
diminishes the persuasive force of Senior and Junior's testimony. 
(R2 at 412; See also Addendum "E" at 3). 
. . . Anderson contends that he was hired by Senior to work on 
remodeling the storage units in St. George and that the employment 
relationship continued on to include work done at Junior's residential 
building site. According to Anderson, all his significant dealings 
were with Senior. He did not see Junior at the building site until the 
project was well underway. In response, Junior claims to have 
personally hired Anderson before the residential project and to have 
negotiated the wage to be paid Anderson. However, Junior was 
unable to accurately state Anderson's wage rate. In contrast, Senior 
was fully aware of Anderson's wage rate. Furthermore, nearly all 
the crew that Senior employed to remodel his storage units also 
worked on Junior's residential project. This supports Anderson's 
testimony that Senior directed his employees, Anderson included, to 
work on Junior's residence. (R2 at 412; See also Addendum "E" at 
3). 
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As is customary in construction projects, Anderson provided his own 
hand tools such as a hammer and saw for both the remodel project 
and the residence project. However, Senior provided large 
equipment such as an air compressor and air-driven nail guns. Junior 
provided no equipment or tools. (R2 at 412; See also Addendum 
"E" at 3). 
There is no question that every payment of wages to Anderson was 
actually made by Senior from his "Kelly Gates Enterprises" 
checking account. At first, Senior testified that his payments to 
Anderson were solely an accommodation to Anderson's frequent 
need for cash and that such payments did not include any payments 
for Anderson's work on Senior's remodeling project. However, 
when confronted by financial records to the contrary, Senior 
conceded that his payments to Anderson represented co-mingled 
wages for work on the remodeling project and the residential project. 
Junior never paid any wages directly to Anderson, although he did 
make payments to Senior. It is clear that Anderson always looked 
directly to Senior, not Junior, for payment of wages. (R2 at 412-3; 
See also Addendum "E" at 3-4). 
Senior was at the work site on a daily basis. Junior was rarely 
present. Because Anderson was an experienced carpenter, he did not 
require much direction in the actual performance of his work. 
However, Senior felt free to exercise control over Anderson. For 
example, Senior testified he ordered Anderson off the job because 
Anderson was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Later in his 
testimony, Senior attempts to downplay his control by stating that he 
merely "suggested" that Anderson not work. But the Commission 
concludes that Senior's initial testimony is the most accurate 
statement of Senior's own perception of his authority over Anderson 
at the work site. The Commission also notes that Senior told the 
workers when to show up for work. Anderson would clear his 
absences from work with Senior. (R2 at 413; See also Addendum 
"E" at 4). 
After his accident, when it became clear that Anderson required 
medical care, Anderson sought payment from Senior. Senior told 
Anderson he didn't have any money and directed Anderson to make 
his request to Junior. Then, despite Senior's previous statement that 
he didn't have any money, Senior transferred $1,000 to Junior, who 
deposited the funds in his own account for use in paying some of 
Anderson's medical expenses. It appears to the Commission that the 
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foregoing transfer of funds from Senior to Junior was intended to 
create some evidence that Junior was Anderson's employer. (R2 at 
413; See also Addendum "E" at 4). 
In addition to the findings of fact of the Labor Commission, the following 
documents were received into evidence: 
a. A "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational 
Disease" dated January 18, 1996, one day after Anderson's accident, 
wherein the emergency room physician indicates that Anderson was 
injured at work and his employer was Gates Enterprises. (Rl at 1). 
b. The Washington County Building Permit Application for the 
Diamond Valley home which was signed by Kelly Gates, Sr., as the 
builder, dated August 29, 1995. (Rl at 211) (Gates indicates that it 
is his signature on the building permit. See R3 at 61). 
c. A series of eight checks made out from Gates, Sr.'s business 
account, Kelly L. Gates Enterprises, to Anderson during the time 
periods in question. (Rl at 188-92). 
d. Answers to Request for Production of Documents consisting of loan 
documents. (Rl at 196-7). This documentation was admittedly 
"doctored" according to testimony of Kelly Gates, Jr. (R3 at 175). 
In addition to the unfavorable documentation and findings issued against 
Gates, the following relevant testimony was elicited at hearing: 
a. Gates' attorney asked Gates whether the money he paid Anderson 
for work on the Diamond Valley home included any hours he 
worked on Gates, Sr.'s office building. Gates, Sr. answered, "No. 
No. Absolutely not." (R3 at 138-9). Gates, Sr. further indicated 
that it would have been highly improper to include anything but 
work that was done on the house. (R3 at 139). However, on cross 
examination, when confronted with the "doctored" records from 
State Bank of Southern Utah (Rl at 196-7), Gates, Sr. admitted that 
the checks which were paid to Anderson must have been a "partial 
payment on the - - on the rentals out here or - - something he done on 
Kolob." (R3 at 146). 
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Upon prompting from his counsel, Gates, Sr. indicated that Anderson 
preferred to be paid in cash. (R3 at 79). Over objection of 
Anderson's counsel, Gates, Sr. testified that the reason Anderson 
wanted to be paid in cash was for "tax purposes". (R3 at 80). 
However, on cross-examination, Gates, Sr. admitted that Anderson 
was paid entirely by check, not cash, for the work he did on the 
Diamond Valley project. (R3 at 90-1). 
Gates, Sr., in an attempt to show Gates, Jr. was Anderson's boss, 
testified that he was present during a conversation wherein Gates, Jr. 
hired Anderson. This apparently took place over the phone. Gates, 
Sr. testified, "I do not recall, but I'm going to say it was over the 
telephone." (R3 at 42), leaving one to speculate how it is that Gates, 
Sr., Gates, Jr., and Mr. Anderson could converse simultaneously 
over the phone. 
In order to explain why Anderson was paid on Gates, Sr.'s business 
account, Gates, Sr., testified that Anderson was requesting money at 
least every other day and it was not possible to get a draw from the 
construction loan more than once every two weeks. (R3 at 46). 
However, all the other framers working on the Diamond Valley 
home, Bret Rasmussen, Brad Cook, Mike Schurtz, and Travis 
Whitsnitzer were all paid out of Kelly L. Gates Enterprises account 
as well. (R3 at 52). 
When initially questioned regarding who signed for the building 
permit on the Diamond Valley home, Gates, Sr. indicated that he 
could not recall who had applied for the building permit, but that he 
assumed his son had done so. (R3 at 61). However, when actually 
presented with a copy of the building permit, Gates, Sr. indicated 
that it was his signature on the building permit. (R3 at 61). Having 
previously testified that he could not recall who had applied for the 
building permit, Gates, Sr. had miraculous recall and was able to 
testify that the reason his son did not apply for the building permit 
was because "he couldn't get off work to go in and get it." (R3 at 
85). 
Gates, Sr. testified that after Anderson's injury, Gates, Sr. loaned his 
son, Gates, Jr. $1,000 to loan Anderson to help Anderson out. That 
check was written on Gates, Sr.'s account then, Gates, Jr. wrote a 
check to Anderson from Gates, Jr.'s own account. (R3 at 63). 
Gates, Sr. initially testified that it was his son who had delivered the 
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check to Anderson, indicating that, "I'm assuming he gave it to 
Mike, the money." (R3 at 71). However, on further examination, 
Gates, Sr. admitted that it was actually Gates, Sr who delivered the 
$1,000 check to Anderson because the doctors "wouldn't work on 
him until we could get him - - he could present some money to 
them." (R3 at 72). 
g. After the hearing of July 1, 1999, it took the Administrative Law 
Judge more than 18 months to issue an order on January 19, 2001. 
(R3 at 356-63; See also Addendum "D"), in spite of Anderson's 
request on six separate occasions requesting an order, (R3 at 350-5), 
leaving one to wonder if the ALJ actually remembered the evidence 
in this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In his brief, Gates fails to marshal any of the Labor Commission's findings against 
him, any of the documentary evidence received at the hearing against him, or any of the 
testimony against him. Further, Gates' brief fails to comply with Rule 24 as it provides 
no legal analysis relative to the issues set forth in the brief, contains no addendum 
containing the orders which have been issued by the Labor Commission, cites 
inappropriately to the record and the law, does not indicate where the issues were 
preserved in the Administrative agency and misrepresents the evidence. Hence, the 
appeal should be summarily dismissed. 
Secondly, the evidence when marshaled is substantial and supports the findings of 
the Labor Commission in awarding workers' compensation benefits to Anderson in this 
case. 
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Finally, Gates' brief is frivolous, misstates the facts and misstates the law. As 
such, an award of attorneys fees and costs should issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
GATES' BRIEF SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT 
On appeal, "'[a] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 
1988) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 92 111. App. 3d 1087, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. 
App. Ct. 1981)) (other citations omitted). Here, Gates' brief is inadequate for numerous 
reasons. 
A. GATES HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ANY OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM 
In setting forth his issues, it is apparent Gates is not satisfied with the findings of 
fact of the Labor Commission. However, he does not indicate which of those findings he 
disputes, let alone marshal any of the evidence which supports the Commission's 
findings. Proper marshaling of the evidence entails marshaling, or listing all of the 
evidence supporting any challenged finding. See, e.g. State Ex ReL T. 7., 945 P.2d 158, 
164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); En Re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 977 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). It is inappropriate for an appellant to marshal the evidence of carefully selected 
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facts and excerpts of testimony in support of his own position, conveniently leaving out 
facts which are negative to his case. See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 
(Utah 1998); Johnson v. Higley, 977 P.2d 1209, 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Additionally, it is not proper to incorrectly state marshaled "facts" in an attempt to 
improve ones position on appeal. See, e.g. State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 608 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994); Johnson v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm 'n, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992). 
Once the evidence has been marshaled with appropriate citations to the record 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(e), the appellant must then show that the marshaled 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings of the trier of fact when viewing 
the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision. See, Child v. 
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998). If an appellant fails to properly marshal the 
evidence, the appellate court must presume the findings to be correct. See, Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1988). 
In his brief, Gates sets forth four issues claiming that he has been substantially 
prejudiced by the findings of the Labor Commission. (See Brief of Gates at pages 1-2). 
Gates then goes on and sets forth a statement of relative [sic] facts wherein he makes 
absolutely no reference to the 16 paragraphs of findings made by the Labor 
Commissioner. (R2 at 410-3; See also Addendum "E" at pages 1-4). These findings of 
the Commission are significant. For example, the Commission found: 
1. Anderson's testimony was "responsive, simple, and straight-forward." (R2 
at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
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2. The testimony of Gates, Sr. and Gates, Jr. is "equivocal and inconsistent." 
(R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
3. Gates, Sr. sought to commit fraud. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 
3). 
4. Gates, Jr. submitted false information to his construction lender. (R2 at 
412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
5. Gates, Jr., the purported employer or Anderson, did not know Anderson's 
wage rate. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
6. Gates, Sr. did know Anderson's wage rate. (R2 at 412; See also, 
Addendum "E" at 3). 
7. Gates, Sr.'s crew that worked at the Diamond Valley project also worked to 
remodel his storage units. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
8. Gates, Sr. provided large equipment to do the Diamond Valley work such as 
a compressor and air-driver nail guns. Gates, Jr. provided no equipment or 
tools. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
9. All of Anderson's wages were paid out of Gates, Sr.'s Kelly Gates 
Enterprises checking account. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
10. Gates, Sr. co-mingled payments to Anderson for work on the Diamond 
Valley and remodeling projects. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
11. Gates, Jr. never made any direct payment to Anderson, but he did make 
payment to Gates, Sr. (R2 at 412-13; See also, Addendum "E" at 3-4). 
12. Anderson always looked to Gates, Sr., not junior, for wage payment. (R2 at 
413; See also, Addendum "E" at 4). 
13. Gates, Sr. was on the job site on a daily basis. Gates, Jr. was there rarely. 
(R2 at 413; See also, Addendum "E" at 4). 
14. Gates, Sr. exercised control over Anderson. (R2 at 413; See also, 
Addendum "E" at 4). 
15. After Anderson was hurt, Gates, Sr. transferred $1,000 to his son, his son 
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then paid the $1,000 to Anderson from the son's personal account. This 
was intended to create some evidence that Gates, Jr. was Anderson's 
employer. (R2 at 413; See also, Addendum "E" at 4). 
In addition to failing to cite to the Commission's findings, Gates, Sr. fails to cite to 
any of the unfavorable documentary evidence against him, such as the checks which were 
written to Anderson on Gates, Sr.'s Kelly Gates Enterprises' account. He likewise fails to 
refer to the physician's first report of injury wherein Anderson tells his treating physician 
that he worked for Gates Enterprises. Further, Gates entirely fails to refer to all of the 
testimony which preponderates against him, such as: 
a. Gates' attorney asked Gates whether the money he paid Anderson 
for work on the Diamond Valley home included any hours he 
worked on Gates, Sr.'s office building. Gates, Sr. answered, "No. 
No. Absolutely not." (R3 at 138-9). Gates, Sr. further indicated 
that it would have been highly improper to include anything but 
work that was done on the house. (R3 at 139). However, on cross 
examination, when confronted with the "doctored" records from 
State Bank of Southern Utah (Rl at 196-7), Gates, Sr. admitted that 
the checks which were paid to Anderson must have been a "partial 
payment on the - - on the rentals out here or - - something he done on 
Kolob." (R3 at 146). 
b. Upon prompting from his counsel, Gates, Sr. indicated that Anderson 
preferred to be paid in cash. (R3 at 79). Over objection of 
Anderson's counsel, Gates, Sr. testified that the reason Anderson 
wanted to be paid in cash was for "tax purposes". (R3 at 80). 
However, on cross-examination, Gates, Sr. admitted that Anderson 
was paid entirely by check, not cash, for the work he did on the 
Diamond Valley project. (R3 at 90-1). 
c. Gates, Sr., in an attempt to show Gates, Jr. was Anderson's boss, 
testified that he was present during a conversation wherein Gates, Jr. 
hired Anderson. This apparently took place over the phone. Gates, 
Sr. testified, "I do not recall, but I'm going to say it was over the 
telephone." (R3 at 42), leaving one to speculate how it is that Gates, 
Sr., Gates, Jr., and Mr. Anderson could converse simultaneously 
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over the phone. 
d. In order to explain why Anderson was paid on Gates, Sr.'s business 
account, Gates, Sr., testified that Anderson was requesting money at 
least every other day and it was not possible to get a draw from the 
construction loan more than once every two weeks. (R3 at 46). 
However, all the other framers working on the Diamond Valley 
home, Bret Rasmussen, Brad Cook, Mike Schurtz, and Travis 
Whitsnitzer were all paid out of Kelly L. Gates Enterprises account, 
as well. (R3 at 52). 
e. When initially questioned regarding who signed for the building 
permit on the Diamond Valley home, Gates, Sr. indicated that he 
could not recall who had applied for the building permit, but that he 
assumed his son had done so. (R3 at 61). However, when actually 
presented with a copy of the building permit, Gates, Sr. indicated 
that it was his signature on the building permit. (R3 at 61). Having 
previously testified that he could not recall who had applied for the 
building permit, Gates, Sr. had miraculous recall and was able to 
testify that the reason his son did not apply for the building permit 
was because "he couldn't get off work to go in and get it." (R3 at 
85). 
f. Gates, Sr. testified that after Anderson's injury, Gates, Sr. loaned his 
son, Gates, Jr. $1,000 to loan Anderson to help Anderson out. That 
check was written on Gates, Sr.'s account then, Gates, Jr. wrote a 
check to Anderson from Gates, Jr.'s own account. (R3 at 63). 
Gates, Sr. initially testified that it was his son who had delivered the 
check to Anderson, indicating that, "I'm assuming he gave it to 
Mike, the money." (R3 at 71). However, on further examination, 
Gates, Sr. admitted that it was actually Gates, Sr. who delivered the 
$1,000 check to Anderson because the doctors "wouldn't work on 
him until we could get him - - he could present some money to 
them." (R3 at 72). 
These facts which were not marshaled, nor even attempted to be marshaled by 
Gates, show that the determination of the labor Commissioner that Gates, Sr. was 
Anderson's employer, was supported by the record. The failure to marshal these facts, 
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pursuant to the above referenced authority, is fatal and Gates, Sr.'s appeal should be 
summarily dismissed. 
B. GATES, SR.'S BRIEF FAILS TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24 
Briefs which are not in compliance with Rule 24 can be stricken or simply 
disregarded by the appellate court. U. R. App. P. 24(i); SLW/UTAH, McKAYv. Hardy, 
973 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1998). Gates, Sr.'s brief, in addition to failing to marshal 
evidence fails for a number of reasons. 
Rule 24(a)(5)(A) requires that a brief "cite to the record showing that the issue was 
preserved in the trial court"; or (B) "a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue 
not preserved in the trial court." In this situation, Gates has done neither. He sets forth 
four issues but makes no attempt to indicate where those issues were preserved in the 
administrative agency, or whether they were required to be preserved. (See brief of Gates 
at 1-2). It is inappropriate for a party to simply "dump the burden of argument and 
research" on the other party. See, State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E. 2d 783, 784 (111. App. Ct. 1981)). 
Additionally, the brief fails to contain an argument setting forth the contentions 
and reasons of Gates with respect to the issues presented as required pursuant to Rule 
24(a)(9). In his brief, Gates identifies, or attempts to identify four separate issues. (See 
brief of Gates at pages 1-2). After setting forth those issues, they are never addressed 
anywhere in the entire body of the brief. Then, Gates appears to reargue the same case 
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that he argued in front of the Labor Commissioner providing little, if any, legal analysis. 
It is not proper to try to reargue the same case which was argued before the trial court. 
See, e.g. Butler, Crockett and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 
P.2d 225, 236 (Utah 1995); Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Further, the authority cited by Gates is irrelevant. In a case appealed from an 
administrative agency, Gates cites two criminal cases that allegedly support his position; 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) and State v. Visser, 31 P.3d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 
2001). Not only are Pena and Visser irrelevant to an administrative proceeding, the 
citation to those cases is inappropriate. At page nine of his brief, Gates portends to quote 
from Pena, but the only citations for the case are indicated as, "(citing case)" and 
"(citation of the case)". In similar fashion, in quoting the Visser case at page ten of the 
brief, Gates indicates, "(citation of case)"... "(citation)". One would think that if these 
two cases were so important Gates could at least find the cites located within the body of 
the cases and inform the Court and counsel as to where it is he is purportedly quoting. 
It is well settled that "[t]he brief of appellant should contain the points relied upon. 
. . and these points should be supported by authorities. . . If the questions involved in a 
case are of sufficient importance to justify asking the Court to decide them, they are 
worthy of careful consideration of counsel presenting them. . . It is the duty of attorneys 
practicing in this Court to present to the Court the authorities supporting their views and 
to assist the Court in reaching a correct conclusion." State v. Thomas, 974 P.2d 269, 272 
(Utah 1999) (quoting En Re Estate ofKunz, 7 111. App. 3d 760, 288 N.E. 2d 520, 523 (111. 
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App. Ct. 1972). 
Gates, Sr.'s failure to appropriately cite to legal authority is surpassed only by his 
inability to cite to the record. In his statement of facts, Gates does attempt to cite to the 
record, with the exception of paragraph 18 which is obviously a legal conclusion.1 
A sampling of the failure to cite to the record is indicated in the following selections 
from Gates5 brief: 
a. "Gates, Sr. also built condos in Santa Clara using a contractor. Those facts 
are rather important evidence in determining whether Gates, Sr. would act 
as a contractor on the construction of his son's own home." (See brief of 
Gates at page 23). 
b. "The fact is, Gates provided only a compressor driven nail gun and the 
compressor, to operate it, after the construction was well underway, in order 
to accelerate the work Anderson was doing for the express purpose of 
saving his son money. That was the only 'large equipment' he provided." 
(See brief of Gates at page 23). 
c. "Perhaps, the last issue of significance is the Commissioner's finding that it 
was Gates, Sr. who 'hired' Anderson to do the work on Gates, IPs house in 
Diamond Valley. He based that determination almost entirely on the 
testimony of Anderson who virtually denied ever meeting Gates II until 
several weeks after he started the project." (See brief of Gates at page 26-
7). 
d. "Gates Sr. himself was not experienced as a contractor or builder. He had 
worked in the automobile business all of his professional life. He loaned 
money to his son to pay the demands of Anderson and other workers until 
Gates II could get a bi-weekly draw on his construction loan to keep 
workers on the job, and he helped out however he could, but he was not a 
contractor and received no compensation or payment for assisting his son, 
except for the satisfaction of helping a son. He did not serve as a contractor 
in building his son's home." (See brief of Gates at page 28). 
Paragraph 18 of the Statement of Relative [sic] Facts found at page seven reads, "Gates II 
was not required to have insurance, since he was building his own home, not subject to the 
workman's compensation laws. See §34A-2-103(7)(b) Utah Code Annotated. 
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e. "Gates, Sr. spent time watching the workers, but acted only on the 
instructions of his son in directing those workers." (See brief of Gates at 
page 29). 
These references contain no cite to the record. Likewise, they don't refer back to 
anything that is cited in the Statement of Relative [sic] Facts. It is almost impossible to 
defend against allegations contained in a brief when there is no admissible evidence cited. 
C. GATES. SR. HAS MISREPRESENTED THE EVIDENCE TO THE COURT 
In his attempt to undermine the findings of the Labor Commissioner, Gates 
alleges, "[i]t is almost impossible in a relatively short brief to state all of the matters, in 
which the respondent [sic] believes the Labor Commissioner made errors in his order 
Granting [sic] the original motion for review in reading and interpreting the evidence, but 
a few will demonstrate, the appellant believes, that the Labor Commissioner erred in 
revising the order and the findings of fact of the ALJ, and that he acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously." (See brief of Gates at page 11). 
Indeed, if there are multiple factual errors on the part of the Labor Commissioner, 
one would presume that Gates, Sr. would identify the most egregious error of the Labor 
Commissioner and point it out to this Court. However, he is not able to do so and instead 
fabricates an "error". Gates argues as follows: 
"The Labor Commissioner in paragraph three of his Order states that Gates, Sr. in 
the past owned an auto dealership and that he had formed another with his son, 
Gates II under the business name of 'Kelly Gates Enterprises.' This is the first of 
numerous misstatements of the record by the Labor Commissioner. The facts are, 
that Kelly Gates, Sr. and his son, Kelly Gates II opened an automobile dealership, 
not under the name of 'Kelly Gates Enterprises' which was Gates, Sr.'s own 
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business, but under the name of 'Sun Land Sales and Leasing5." (See brief of 
Gates at page 11). 
Gates' attempt to discredit the Labor Commissioner entirely misstates the 
evidence. The Labor Commissioner, in his order, did not find that Gates, Sr. and Gates, 
Jr. owned an auto dealership under the name "Kelly Gates Enterprises." The Labor 
Commissioner determined as follows: 
"Senior is a businessman in the St. George area. In the past, he owned and 
operated an auto dealership in St. George, by the time of the hearing in this 
matter, he had formed another automobile business, this time with Junior, 
his son. Under the business name of 'Kelly Gates Enterprises,' Senior owns 
rental units, condominiums, and town homes." 
(R2 at 411; See also, Addendum "E" at 2). 
Indeed, the testimony from Gates, Sr. supports the finding of the Labor 
Commissioner. Gates, Sr. testified: 
Q. Okay. And are you employed presently? 
A. Yes and no. I'm semi-retired. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I'm in the automobile business. 
Q. And is that in the automobile business with your son, Kelly Gates, Jr.? 
A. Yes. 
(R3 at 20). 
Gates further testified: 
Q. Can you tell me what Kelly L. Gates Enterprises is? 
A. That is - - basically, it's the rental units that I have, condominiums, town 
homes, various business that I have. 
Q. The same business - - part of that same business is the offices out on 
Sunset? 
A. There's no offices there, they're not finished, but the storage units are there, 
and yes that's part of my - -
Q. Kelly Gates Enterprises? 
A. Kelly Gates Enterprises. 
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(R3 at 46). 
A plain reading of the findings of the Labor Commissioner is that Kelly Gates, Sr. 
and Junior own an automobile dealership together. The record clearly indicates that is 
true. Additionally, the Labor Commissioner determined that Kelly Gates, Sr. was the sole 
owner of Kelly Gates Enterprises. That is supported by the record. Gates' 
characterization of the Labor Commissioner's findings regarding Kelly Gates Enterprises 
is absurd. The determination of the Labor Commissioner is clear. It is apparent that 
Gates and his attorney are willing to misrepresent the facts to this Court in an attempt to 
argue their position. That is inappropriate. 
As Gates has entirely failed to marshal the evidence, provide any type of 
meaningful legal analysis, has failed to follow Rule 24 and has misrepresented matters to 
this Court, his appeal should be summarily dismissed. 
IL 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE 
LABOR COMMISSION 
While Gates' brief portends to set forth four "issues", the sum of his argument 
appears to be that there is insufficient evidence to support the findings of the Labor 
Commission. However, Gates makes no attempt to identify the findings of the 
Commission to which he takes issue. This in and of itself is a fatal flaw to his appeal. 
Indeed, failure to appropriately challenge the findings of the Labor Commission must 
necessarily result in those findings being conclusive for the purposes of appeal. Osman 
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Home Improvement v. Indus. Comm 'n, 958 P.2d 240, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
However, assuming that Gates' convoluted argument and issues are sufficient to 
raise an issue as to the sufficiency of the findings of the Labor Commissioner, the 
evidence, when marshaled, is overwhelming that Kelly Gates, Sr. was the employer of 
Anderson. 
As indicated by the Labor Commission, "it is well established that when an 
employer has retained the right to control the worker of a workers' compensation 
claimant, the claimant is the employer's employee for workers' compensation purposes." 
(citing Bennett v. Indus. Comm fn, 726 P.2d 427, 429-30 (Utah 1986). (R2 at 413; See 
also, Addendum "E" at 4). 
It is unrefuted that Gates, Sr. was an uninsured employer without workers' 
compensation insurance. The Labor Commission, quite succinctly, indicates that Gates 
made the frank admission that he had hired people to remodel storage units, including 
Anderson, which was not in compliance with state and federal laws requiring withholding 
of income tax, FICA tax, unemployment insurance contribution, as well as workers' 
compensation insurance. (R2 at 412; See also, Addendum "E" at 3). 
Yet Gates, who is clearly violating several different laws, wishes to have the Labor 
Commission, as well as this Court, believe the "story" that it was not really he, but his 
son, who hired Anderson to work on the Diamond Valley home. The problem with this 
argument is that every piece of documentary evidence points to Kelly Gates, Sr. and his 
dba, Kelly Gates Enterprises, as being the employer of Anderson. Every paycheck that 
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was issued to Anderson was issued on Kelly Gates Enterprises' account. It was not 
drawn on Kelly Gates, Sr.'s personal account, but his business account which included 
additional projects on which he had Anderson working. 
Further, when Anderson was taken in for medical treatment, he told the treating 
physician that his employer was Kelly Gates Enterprises. That fact is identified in the 
Physician's first report of injury and at that time, Anderson could not have possibly 
known that a defense would arise that Kelly Gates, Jr. was his employer. It was a 
statement that showed his then existing state of mind, before any legal proceedings began. 
As Anderson stated at the time of hearing, he believed his employer to be the man who 
paid him his wage, Kelly Gates, Sr. (R3 at 123). 
Additionally, Gates, Sr.'s testimony was not believable. Gates, Sr. initially 
testified that Anderson wanted to be paid cash for "tax purposes". However, when 
confronted with his own checks drawn on the Kelly Gates Enterprises account, Gates, Sr. 
had to admit that Anderson was always paid by check, not by cash, for work on the 
Diamond Valley home. 
Likewise, in an attempt to show that his son was Anderson's employer, Gates, Sr. 
testified that his son delivered a $1,000 check to Anderson so Anderson could see the 
doctor. However, upon additional examination, Gates admitted that it was he, Gates, Sr., 
who delivered the check to Anderson. 
Further evidence of the scheme is evidenced by the $1,000 check which was 
written out as a "loan" to Anderson. Gates, Sr., while testifying outside of the presence of 
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his son, and having been examined vigorously with documentation including his own 
checks, was a little wary when testifying as to where the $1,000 came from and make the 
frank admission that the $1,000 offered to Anderson came from Gates, Sr. Contrary to 
the testimony of his father, Gates, Jr. testified that this was money that Gates, Jr. had 
obtained from his construction account. It was relatively obvious that Gates, Jr. and 
Gates, Sr. were not quite able to get their stories straight as to who paid the $1,000 to 
Anderson. 
The documents received into evidence as well as the testimony of the witnesses, 
which was incorporated into the Commission's findings, is relatively clear. Kelly Gates, 
Sr. was Anderson's employer and the defense asserted in this case is lainted with lies and 
misstatements. The evidence in this case is substantial and justifies the findings of the 
Labor Commissioner that Gates, Sr. was Anderson's employer. 
III. 
GATES9 APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW AND AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS SHOULD ISSUE 
In relevant part, Utah R. App. P. 33(a) provides that attorney fees and single or 
double costs can be awarded to a party when they have to defend an appeal which is 
frivolous or brought for the sole purpose of delay. A frivolous appeal has been defined 
as, u[o]ne in which no justiciable question has been presented and appeal is readily 
recognizable as devoid of merit and that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed." 
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Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th 
ed. 1979). 
In this situation, Gates' appeal is frivolous. As indicated previously, the brief of 
Gates makes no attempt to marshal any of the evidence against him, which includes his 
own contradictory testimony, the documentation which speaks for itself, as well as the 
findings of the Labor Commissioner. Further, his legal analysis regarding the citation of 
two criminal cases is void of any benefit to this Court. His failure to properly cite to 
either the record or case law is inappropriate. Additionally, his failure to indicate where 
any issues had been preserved before the administrative agency is inappropriate. Also, 
his conduct is misstating the Commission's findings as to the relationship between Kelly 
Gates, Jr. and Kelly Gates, Sr. in forming an automobile partnership is improper. 
The above mentioned conduct is sanctionable in and of itself. However, Gates has 
gone further than simply submitting a baseless brief. He has referenced admittedly 
"doctored" evidence and makes argument that is not based in fact or law. 
At hearing, Gates' responses to Interrogatories, Request for Production of 
Documents and Things was admitted into evidence. (Rl at 173-210). The answers and 
corresponding documents were signed under oath by Kelly Gates, Sr. (Rl at 186-7). The 
bank documentation in the form of "loan advances" attached to the Request for 
Production of Documents appearing at page 196-7 of the record were admittedly 
"doctored" according to the testimony of Kelly Gates, Jr. (R3 at 175). 
That "doctored" evidence came in the form of discovery responses from Kelly 
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Gates, Sr. It was his witness, Kelly Gates, Jr. who indicated those documents were 
"doctored". Yet, instead of correcting the "doctored" documents which were received 
into evidence, Gates, Sr. instead relies on the bank records throughout the course of his 
brief: 
Q. Okay. Wasn't Mr. Rasmussen paid for work on your son's home in 
Diamond Valley on checks drawn on the account of Kelly Gates 
Enterprises? 
A. Yes. And so was Mr. Anderson. 
Q. So they weren't paid by your son, they were paid by your company? 
A. Mr. Anderson would come in at least every other day and want to get paid, 
and my son, I called him up one day and he explained that he took a draw 
every two weeks, he couldn't pay him except every two weeks, so we 
would write - he'd say dad, would you write him a check, I'll reimburse 
you, which we did and which I was reimbursed by the bank and that's the 
way it was submitted. (Emphasis in original) (See brief of Gates at page 
24-5). 
In his brief, Gates continues to rely on the testimony referring to bank records: 
Q. But he didn't pay the helpers, you paid the helpers? 
A. They weren't working for him, they were working for my son. 
Q. I see. And they were paid by you? 
A. My son would ask me to pay them and he'd make the draw and reimburse 
me. (Emphasis in original) 
Q. (By Mr. Wright): Now, you also indicated that (Anderson) wanted to be 
paid more often than every two weeks or whenever the draws were 
available at the bank; is that right? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And some of the documents you looked at indicated he was paid sometimes 
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every other day; is that right? 
A. One time he was paid the next day. . . 
Q. Okay. And so when that happened, did Mr. Kelly Gates, Jr. have the 
money to pay those requests on a daily basis like that? 
A. No. He did not. In fact, he told Mr. Anderson that it would be paid by a 
draw and it would be two to three weeks on a draw. 
(See brief of Gates at page 25). 
Not only did Gates, Sr. rely on the falsified bank documents, but so did Kelly 
Gates, Jr. in his testimony. That is again identified in Gates' brief: 
Q. Did you have funds of your own to cover his requests between draws? 
A. No. No. 
Q. Okay. So what happened then? 
A. Dad would pay Mike, and then when I could turn in a draw every week or 
every two weeks, I'd reimburse dad. (Emphasis in original) 
(See brief of Gates at page 26). 
Gates, Sr. relies on testimony and documentation regarding the draws to such an 
extent that he emphasizes the testimony in his brief by underlining the references. One 
would hope that Gates and his attorney would take remedial steps to correct the 
"doctored" documents. However, they do the opposite and refer to the "doctored" draws 
to support the claim made in this appeal. That is inappropriate conduct and should not be 
condoned by this Court. 
In addition to the above mentioned improprieties, Gates makes legal argument 
which has no merit. Gates raises, as his first issue, whether he "was substantially 
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prejudiced by the Labor Commissioner who did not participate in the hearing, did not 
hear the testimony, observe the witnesses and with only a cold transcript before him, 
reversed the Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law and Order the Administrative 
Judge who heard the case, observed the witnesses, and reviewed the evidence? (See brief 
of Gates at 1). The law on this point is relatively clear. 
The Utah Labor Code specifically allows the Commission to reverse the findings 
of the Administrative Law Judge. In relevant part, UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-l-303(4)(a) 
provides, "on appeal, the Commissioner or the Appeals Board may: 
(i) affirm the decision of an Administrative Law Judge; 
(ii) modify the decision of an Administrative Law Judge; 
(iii) return the case to an Administrative Law Judge for further action as directed; 
or 
(iv) reverse the findings, conclusions, and decisions of an Administrative Law 
Judge." (Emphasis added) 
Obviously, the legislature has granted to the Labor Commissioner and the Appeals 
Board the authority to reverse the findings of the ALJ. Further, Utah case law supports 
the conclusion that the final arbiter of the findings of fact in a case before the Labor 
Commission is the Labor Commission, not the ALJ. 
In United States Steel v. Industrial Comm 'n 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980), the 
Supreme Court dealt with facts very similar to those addressed here. There, after an 
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evidentiary hearing on an injured workers claim for workers compensation benefits, the 
ALJ determined the injured worker lacked credibility, found no work accident to have 
occurred, and denied compensation. The injured worker sought review by the Industrial 
Commission. Based on the same record which was in front of the ALJ, the Commission 
found that the injured worker had indeed been involved in an accident at work. 
U.S. Steel appealed and argued that it was improper for the Labor Commission to 
substitute its findings for those of the ALJ, particularly when the ALJ had based his 
findings on the credibility of a witness. The Supreme Court rejected U.S. Steel's 
argument summarily: 
Our statutes do not mandate or indicate that the Commission is bound by 
the findings of the Administrative Law Judge when the evidence is 
conflicting. On the contrary, Section 35-1-82.54 provides that when a case 
is referred to the full Commission, it shall review the entire record, and may 
make its own findings of fact and enter its award thereon. In doing so it 
may, in its discretion, take further evidence. Though this Court cannot 
overturn the findings of fact made by the Commission if there is substantial 
evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for such findings, there is nothing in 
our statutes which limits the power of the Commission itself in reviewing 
and adopting or reversing the findings of its Administrative Law Judge. . . 
(citations omitted). 
Utah Appellate Courts have always held that an ALJ's findings are not binding in 
later proceedings before an administrative agency. See, Giles v. Industrial Comm 'n 967 
P.2d 743, 745 (Utah 1984); USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm % 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989); Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Chase v. Industrial Comm 'n 872 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Commercial 
Carriers v. Industrial Comm 'n, 888 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
31 
On this issue, Utah law is consistent with the majority rule in other states. As 
noted by Professor Larson in Larson's Workers Compensation Law §80.12(b), p. 15-565: 
It also follows logically that the rule of conclusiveness of administrative 
findings of fact should apply to the final action of the Director or full 
Board, rather than the decision of the referee. . . . The fact that the 
Commission took no new evidence is immaterial. Moreover, in states 
adhering to the orthodox rule, no exception is made even when the issue is 
credibility of a witness, and when only the referee and not the Commission 
had the benefit of first hand observation of the witness. 
Utah Law is clear that the Commission has the authority to supplant the ALJ's 
findings of fact with it's own based upon the same evidence presented to the ALJ. 
Indeed, that is the rule from the majority of jurisdictions. 
The above referenced argument was set forth in Anderson's Motion for Summary 
Disposition before this Court. Obviously, Gates must be aware that his argument the 
Commission cannot supplant the findings of the ALJ is without merit. In fact Gates for 
the first time "acknowledges that the Commissioner had the authority and the power to 
reverse the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, but due process demands there be a 
legally justifiable basis for such reversal." (See brief of Gates at page 9). 
Nevertheless, Gates goes on to make the exact same argument that he made in 
front of the administrative agency, that the two criminal cases to which he cites are 
relevant to an administrative proceeding. (R2 at 427-47). In fact, the argument that he 
made in front of the Appeals Board is parroted back in his brief almost verbatim. That is 
not appropriate. There is no merit to the legal argument set forth in Gates' brief and it 
should be summarily dismissed and attorney fees and costs should be awarded. 
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CONCLUSION 
The brief of Gates fails, in almost every respect, to comply with Rule 24 and 
should not be considered by this Court. The evidence in this case, when marshaled, is 
clear and supports the findings of the Labor Commissioner in all respects. Finally, the 
appeal brought by Gates is not brought or asserted in good faith, is frivolous in all aspects 
and, as such, an award of attorney fees and costs should enter. 
DATED this £j ^ day of May, 2002. 
:>n J. (Prkbxey--^^,. Aaron J. (Pii 
Attorney fdrPeti'tioner/Appellant 
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(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall 
Dntam under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
)urt or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, 
ccept where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names 
all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate 
ige which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the 
Idendum, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged 
id with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
Lthorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief 
tere they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate 
urt. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including 
r each issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting 
thonty; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved 
the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
eserved m the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
galations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal 
of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim 
th the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the 
ovision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
ovision shall be set forth m an addendum to the brief under 
ragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate 
Lefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and 
5 disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts 
Levant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
atements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
-agraph (e) of this rule. 
'8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
agraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments 
ually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere 
)etition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and 
isons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
luding the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
ts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding 
t first marshall all record evidence that supports the challenged 
ding. 
10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as 
t of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably 
ck. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall 
tain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy 
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any constitutional provision, statute rule, or regulation 
>ntral importance cited in the brief but not reproduced 
itim m the brief; 
in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court 
)peals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central 
tance to the appeal but not available to the court as part 
regularly published reporter service; and 
those parts of the record on appeal that are of central 
tance to the determination of the appeal, such as the 
enged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
"andum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, 
le contract or document subject to construction. 
Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall 
)rm to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except 
the appellee need not include: 
a statement of the issues or of the case unless the 
Llee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
i an addendum, except to provide material not included in the 
idum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum 
le appellant. 
> Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief m reply to the 
Z of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, 
appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the 
Llant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply 
fs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
apposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform 
le requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of 
rule. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of 
appellate court. 
) References m briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected 
leir briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
trences to parties by such designations as "appellant" and 
Bllee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in 
Lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names 
arties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
red person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
) References m briefs to the record. References shall be 
to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to 
11 (b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
aedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11 (f) 
1 (g). References to pages of published depositions or 
scripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover 
of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right 
er and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within 
deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber, 
rences to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
rence is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in 
roversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record 
hich the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
cted. 
) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, 
cipal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs 
1 not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the 
e of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
aming statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the 
rd as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases 
lving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal 
filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
emed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, 
less the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders, 
e brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. 
e brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the 
sues and arguments involved m the cross-appeal as well as the 
swer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 50 
ges in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which 
ntains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
pellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response 
the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The 
oellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 pages m length. The 
oellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not to 
reed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
Dellant's answers to the original issues raised by the 
Dellee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by 
LS rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of 
:horities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission 
the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good 
ise shown. 
(h) Briefs m cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. 
cases involving more than one appellant or appellee, including 
ses consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of 
.her may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee 
/ adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties 
/ similarly join m reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and 
jnificant authorities come to the attention of a party after 
it party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but 
ore decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the 
)ellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An 
ginal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
rt. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the 
irt of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page 
the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations 
tain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 
ays of filing and shall be similarly limited. 
j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must 
concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with 
per headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial 
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
regarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, 
the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
yer. 
k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy 
er stock and shall comply with Rule 27. 
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mber of Copies 
Supreme Court: Ten copies - one with original signature. 
Court of Appeals: Eight copies - one with original signature. 
Two copies served on counsel for each party separately represented, 
ngth 
Appellant and Appellee: 50 pages, excluding addendum. 
Reply: 25 pages, excluding addendum. 
Petition for Rehearing: 15 pages, excluding addendum, 
ze and Binding 
Size: 81/2" x 11". 
Binding: Compact or Velio binding required; coiled plastic or 
al binding not acceptable. 
inting Requirements 
Margins at least one inch on top, bottom and sides of each page. 
Proportionally spaced typeface must be 13-pomt or larger for both 
and footnotes. A monospaced typeface may not contain more than ten 
meters per inch for both text and footnotes. 
Print on both sides of the page. 
Double spaced; 11/2 line spacing is not acceptable. 
/er Requirements 
Heavy weight paper. 
Color: 
reliant or Petitioner . . . 
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ltion for Rehearing . . . . 
>ponse to Pet'n for Rehearing 
ltion for Certiorari . . . 
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ency (e.g., "plaintiff/defendant"); 
c. designation of zne parties as they appear in the appellate court 
.g., "appellant/appellee"). 
4. Name of the appellate court ("In the Utah Supreme Court") ("In the 
ah Court of Appeals"). 
5. Appellate court docket number. 
6. Title of the document (e.g., "Brief of the Appellant", "Brief of 
e Appellee"). 
7. Nature of the proceeding (e.g., "appeal", "petition for review"). 
3. Name of the trial court or agency and name of the judge (e.g., 
Dpeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judge Smith"). 
d . Name of counsel and the parties they represent: 
a. counsel filing brief on lower right; 
}. opposing counsel on lower left. 
Content Requirements - In the Order Stated 
List of all parties unless the caption on the cover shows all 
ties . 
'. Table of contents with page references. 
Table of authorities with page references: (a) cases listed 
>habetically with parallel citations; (b) rules; (c) statutes; (d) 
er authorities. 
Statement showing jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
Statement of the issues. For each issue state the standard of 
lew and supporting authority. (Optional with appellee if there is no 
agreement with appellant's statement.) 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, and 
es set forth verbatim or by citation alone if they are set forth 
batim in the addendum. 
Statement of the case (Optional with appellee if there is no 
agreement with appellant's statement): 
nature of the case; 
course of proceedings; 
disposition at trial court or agency. 
Relevant facts with citation to the record. 
Summary of the argument. 
). Detail of the argument. 
L. Conclusion containing a statement of the relief sought. 
\ Original signature of counsel of record or party appearing without 
lsel on one copy of brief; reproduced signature on other copies. 
idendum 
Attach at end of brief or file separately. 
Not counted against tuidl page numoei. 
Contents: 
Reproduction of opinion, memorandum decision, findings of fact, 
lusions of law, orders, or jury instructions; 
Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance such as 
racts or other documents; 
Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ules. Supplement to the Brief 
By letter to the court. Original and nine copies to Supreme Court. 
inal and five copies to Court of Appeals. 
File any time prior to decision, even after oral argument. 
Citation of supplemental authority with statement of reason. No new 
ment. 
Reference to page of brief or point in oral argument supplemented. 
Response to be filed within seven days. 
tion for Enlargement of Time 
By stipulation: Rule 26 
first extension only; 
limit: 30 days; 
file prior to expiration of original deadline. 
By motion: Rules 22 & 23 
File prior to deadline; show original deadline sought to be extended; 
Show number and length of previous extensions; 
Give date certain on which brief will be filed; 
Set forth facts constituting good cause for the request. 
nded effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; 
1 1, 1998; November 1, 1999; amended effective April 1, 2002.) 
Addendum B 
-4b£>-16. Judicial review - Formal 
judicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals 
3 jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
judicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from 
-mal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for 
new of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form 
juired by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
b^ The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall 
rem all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for 
iicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the 
in Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, 
imarize, or organize the record; 
b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
les for the record: 
I) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, 
m a n z e , or organize the record; or 
II) according to any other provision of law. 
4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review 
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency 
ion is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any 
tute; 
c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring 
olution; 
d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
:ess, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as 
scision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
}) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
.led by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
;ed m light of the whole record before the court; 
I) the agency action is: 
_) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
i) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
n ) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
ifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate 
tir and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
v) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Addendum C 
torney•s zees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first 
Deal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that 
notion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
LVOIOUS or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
:lude single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
asonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may 
ier that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
.orney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
)eal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded 
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good 
th argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An 
)eal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose 
delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
ass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or 
n time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
ion, brief, or other paper. 
c) Procedures. 
1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or 
n its own motion. A party may request damages under this rule 
y as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition 
er Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a 
ty's response to a motion or other paper. 
2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, 
court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or 
h an order to show cause why such damages should not be 
rded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations 
ch form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days 
which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause 
wn. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral 
ument. 
3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be 
rded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
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July 1,1999 at 3:00 P.M. 
Fifth District Court 
Courtroom J 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
George M. Anderson (Anderson, petitioner or applicant) is 
represented by attorney Aaron Prisbrey. 
The respondent, Kelly Gates Sr. (Gates Sr. or respondent) is 
represented by attorney J. MacArthur Wright. 
The Uninsured Employer's Fund is represented by attorney 
Sherrie Hayashi. 
INTRODUCTION OF CASE 
Anderson filed a pro se Application for Hearing with the Labor Commission on 
August 27,1997 requesting medical expenses, temporary total and permanent partial 
disability compensation and travel expenses. Anderson alleges that he sustained an 
industrial accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by Kelly Gates Sr. 
on January 17,1996. That Application was assigned case number 97694, a copy was 
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sent to the Respondents, an Answer thereto was timely filed and the matter was 
ultimately set for this hearing. Attorney Prisbrey entered the case on behalf of the 
petitioner on March 24,1998. 
Seven exhibits were admitted without objection, four by the petitioner and three 
by the respondents. Petitioner invoked the exclusionary rule and accordingly the 
witnesses were sworn, instructed, and all that were not parties left the room. After 
having taken that step, the petitioner then called respondent Kelly Gates Sr. as his first 
witness and examined him extensively for over two hours. Petitioner called as his 
second witness Seymour Hoskins, and at last petitioner presented his own testimony. 
It should be noted that there are two Kelly Gates, father (who is the respondent) 
and his son, hereinafter respectively referred to as Gates Sr. and Gates II. 
The respondents presented the testimony of Gates Sr. and Gates II. 
The issue for resolution is whether Gates was an employer and Anderson an 
employee within the purview of the Workers Compensation Act, or whether the work 
Anderson was doing was exempted from the Workers Compensation Act pursuant to 
U.C.A. 34A-2-103 (6)(b) exempting those constructing their own home. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The occurrence of Anderson's injury on January 17,1996, the ensuing treatment, 
time off work and impairment are not contested. It is stipulated that he was working 26 
hours per week at $12 per hour, was married and had one child. 
Although Hoskins was listed as the contractor and did put in the footings for the 
house, he denied that he was the general contractor and no party has joined him in this 
action. Hoskins testified that he knew Gates II was building the house and that Gates 
Sr. was just helping his son. 
As he had been for approximately 6 weeks on January 17,1996 Anderson was 
involved in framing a personal residence for Gates II. When Anderson was breaking a 
metal band around some lumber, the band struck and lacerated his left wrist. 
Anderson was off work from the date of injury to June 1, I996 when he was released to 
full duty. 
Gates Sr's livelihood was in automobile dealerships from which he is now semi-
retired, i.e., he still has an interest in a St. George dealership. Gates Sr. had hired a 
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contractor to build an apartment house for him previously in 1985. He also has some 
storage units, two of which he was remodeling into office space with Anderson and 
other assistants. At Anderson's request, Anderson was paid cash for his work on the 
conversion. Anderson also did some work for Gates Sr. at a personal cabin in Kolob 
canyon. Anderson made the same request for payment in cash for the work on the 
cabin. The storage-unit-to-office conversion was going on at the same time as the 
construction of Gates ll's home, where the alleged industrial accident occurred. Gates 
Sr. had built his own home previously and the same plans were used in the 
construction of this home for Gates II. 
Gates Sr. gave Gates II the lot where the accident occurred on the condition 
that he would live on it for at least 5 years. Gates Sr. advised his son to build his own 
home because of the savings that Gates II could make. On August 17,1995, Gates II 
and his wife took out a construction loan in their sole names to build the house. Gates 
II was 21 years old at the time and intended for this house to be his family's own home. 
Gates II hired Anderson to work for him at $12 per hour. Anderson came to work when 
he wanted. 
At the time the home was being constructed, Gates II was working full time but 
varying shifts at Smith's. During the same period, he was also working approximately 
30 hours flex time at a car lot as a commission salesman. Both jobs were 
approximately 10 to 12 minutes from the home site. 
Petitioner Anderson was newly married and his wife was pregnant at the time 
Anderson was working on Gates ll's home. Anderson often asked Gates II for payment 
after having worked just a day or two but Gates II could only submit reimbursement 
requests from the construction loan at two week intervals. Since Gates II could not 
personally advance the requested amounts to Anderson [it does seem unlikely that at 
21 years old and married, he was working two jobs for any reason other than economic 
necessity], and he wanted to keep Anderson on the job, he asked his father to make 
the interim payments Anderson requested. Gates Sr. made those payments from his 
business checking account, Gates Enterprises. When Gates II would submit his 
reimbursement request to the bank and that was received, he would pay his father 
back. Gates Sr. did not receive any consideration for the sums advanced, doing so 
only at his son's request to help him out. 
With his son working long hours on two jobs, semi-retired Gates Sr. would also 
help his son by going to the home to monitor Anderson and other workmen's hours, run 
errands for materials, and help as requested by Anderson. Gates Sr. also advanced at 
his son's request, payments to other individuals working on the house, who had the 
same frequent need for money as did Anderson. Gates Sr. was always reimbursed for 
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the exact amounts that he advanced on his son's behalf. 
After Anderson was injured, and since he had no personal health insurance, he 
went to Gates II and asked for some help so he could get the medical attention that he 
needed. In anticipation that Anderson would soon return and be able to work off any 
advance, Gates II recalls that he loaned Anderson $2,500; $1,000 by his personal 
check dated January 31,1996, another $1,000.00 check and $500.00 in cash. Gates II 
thinks he got some of the money from the bank under a construction loan advance, 
while Gates Sr. thinks he advanced $1,000.00 of that for his son. 
Anderson attempts to interject the tests to determine whether a person is an 
independent contractor or an employee in ascertaining whether this is a covered 
accident. That is not an appropriate test when the question is whether the exemption 
for a personal residence applies. In this case, Gates Sr. was just the interim financing 
until his son was able to get draws from the bank and then Gates Sr. was promptly 
reimbursed. There has been no showing that this residence was intended for anything 
other than Gates ll's personal residence. Gates Sr. did not own the lot, he was not 
building this home, he did not take out the loan for the financing on it, and he received 
nothing but a return of the amounts he advanced on his son's behalf. In the financial 
respect as well as in having the time flexibility in his semi-retired situation to go to the 
home site and keep track of the hours worked by various individuals, Gates Sr. was a 
simply a father helping his son, or at worst, a beneficent agent for his son. 
There is a question of credibility in this case, that is raised by the vastly different 
representations between Anderson's testimony and all of the other witnesses. 
However, where petitioner so ordered the testimony of Gates Sr. before his own, the 
opportunity for adaptive testimony was in Anderson's hands and he fully utilized it. His 
testimony is starkly contrary in nearly every respect with all of the other witnesses, 
Gates Sr., Gates II (who had been excluded under the petitioner's invocation of the 
exclusionary rule), and his own witness, Seymour Hoskins. Having had an opportunity 
to observe the testimony, candor and demeanor of the witnesses over the course of this 
five-hour hearing, and considering the powerful economic incentive to Anderson in 
gaining $4200+ in temporary total disability compensation and $6,800+ in permanent 
partial disability compensation as well as avoiding the substantial medical expenses 
incurred, the ALJ finds that Anderson lacks credibility. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Although no claim was brought against him, a preponderance of the evidence 
establishes that Kelly Gates II was engaged in the construction of his personal 
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residence and was therefore not an employer pursuant to U.C.A. 34A-2-103 (6) (b). 
Petitioner George Anderson has failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Kelly Gates Sr. was his employer on January 17,1996 while Anderson was 
working on Gates ll's home, therefore all of the petitioners claims against Kelly Gates 
Sr. and the Uninsured Employers Fund should be dismissed with prejudice. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that all of the petitioner George M. Anderson's 
claims under the Application for Hearing filed August 27,1997 against Kelly Gates Sr. 
(aka Kelle Gates Sr.) are hereby denied and dismissed with prejudice. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the 
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set 
forth the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 
days from the date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their 
Responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for 
Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission 
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for 
Review or its Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the 
Appeals Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
DATED THIS 19th day of January, 2001 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
George M. Anderson 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GEORGE M. ANDERSON, 
ORDER GRANTING 
Applicant, - MOTION FOR REVIEW 
v. - ORDER OF REMIND 
KELLY GATES, SR. and 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, 
Defendants. - Case No. 97-0694 
George M Anderson asks the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law 
Judge's denial of Mr Anderson's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the 
Act", Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann ) 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin Code R602-2-1 M 
BACKGROUND 
On January 17, 1996, Mr Anderson was working as a carpenter, framing a residence to be 
occupied by Kelly Gates Jr ("Junior' hereafter) As Anderson cut a metal band holding a stack of 
lumber, the metal band snapped and cut his wrist Surgery was required to repair the injury 
Anderson was unable to work for a period of time after the accident, he may also have suffered some 
permanent impairment 
Anderson contends he was employed by Junior's father. Kelly Gates Sr (* Senior" hereafter) 
at the time of his accident and that Senior is liable for his workers' compensation benefits In 
response, Senior argues that Anderson was employed by Junior at the time of his accident Senior 
further argues that, because Anderson was employed by Junior in the construction of Junior's own 
residence, Anderson is excluded from co\ erage under the workers' compensation system by §34A-2-
103(6)(b)oftheAct 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Who was Mr Anderson's employer at the time of his work-related accident on January 17 
19969 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
After careful review of the testimony and other evidence presenled in this matter, the 
Commission sets aside the ALJ's findings of fact and substitutes the following findings. 
It is undisputed that Anderson's injuries resulted from a work-related accident on January 
17, 1996. It is also undisputed that Anderson was an employee, rather than an independent 
contractor, at the time of the accident. To determine whether Anderson was employed by Junior or 
Senior, it is necessary to re\iew the circumstances and context of Anderson's work and his 
relationships with Senior and Junior. 
Senior is a businessman in the St. George area. In the past, he owned and operated an auto 
dealership in St. George, by the time of the hearing in this matter, he had formed another automobile 
business, this time with Junior, his son. Under the business name of "Kelly Gates Enterprises," 
Senior owns rental units, condominiums, and town homes. He was also a principal in the 
development of a residential subdivision known as Diamond Ranches, located about 15 miles from 
St. George. Senior gave Junior a residential building lot in the Diamond Ranch subdivision. It was 
at this lot, in the course of the construction of Junior's residence, that Anderson was injured. 
At the time of Anderson's accident, Junior was 22 years old. He had little or no experience 
with building or construction. He was employed on a full-time basis as an assistant manager at a 
grocery store and also worked 30 hours a week as a salesman at a local car dealership, both in St. 
George. 
In November, 1995, Senior hired Anderson to work on a cabin Senior was building for his 
personal use in the Kolob Canyon area north of St. George. Shortly thereafter, Senior also hired 
Anderson and several other workers to remodel two storage units located in St. George into business 
offices. At the same time as the storage units were being remodeled, Anderson and the other 
workers began construction of Junior's residence in Diamond Ranch, where Anderson suffered his 
injury on January 17, 1996. 
The parties do not substantially dispute the foregoing facts. However, the parties tell very 
different versions of the remaining facts. Before the Commission sets out its findings on these 
disputed issues, some general comments are in order regarding the relative credibility of the parties. 
The ALJ discounted Anderson's testimony, in part, because of his economic self-interest in 
obtaining workers' compensation benefits. But Senior, who has no workers' compensation 
insurance, has an equivalent economic interest in avoiding payment of such benefits. Consequently, 
economic interest does not provide a means of judging the relative credibility of Anderson and 
Senior. 
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The ALJ also discounted Anderson's testimony on the grounds it was contradicted by the 
testimony of all other witnesses. However, after careful review of Anderson's testimony, the 
Commission finds such testimony to be responsive, simple and straight-forward. Furthermore. 
Anderson's testimony does not conflict with the testimony of Mr. Hoskins, the only disinterested 
individual to testify in this matter. 
The Commission has also carefully reviewed the testimony of Senior and Junior and finds 
it to be equivocal and inconsistent. Furthermore, Senior and Junior admit to conduct that 
undermines their general credibility. For example. Senior asked Mr. Hoskins. a construction 
contractor, to turn in Anderson's injury as a claim against Hoskins' workers' compensation insurance 
policy. Such a claim would have been fraudulent. To his credit, Mr. Hoskins refused Senior's 
request. As another example, even in the project to remodel storage units, where Senior admits to 
being Anderson's employer, Senior failed to comply with state and federal laws requiring 
withholding of income tax, payment of FICA tax, unemployment insurance contributions, and 
obtaining workers' compensation coverage. Finally, Junior admits that he submitted false 
information to his construction lender in order to obtain funds to pay Anderson's medical expenses. 
The foregoing conduct diminishes the persuasive force of Senior and Junior's testimony. 
Returning to the facts of this case, Anderson contends he was hired by Senior to work on 
remodeling the storage units in St. George and that the employment relationship continued on to 
include work done at Junior's residential building site. According to Anderson, all his significant 
dealings were with Senior. He did not see Junior at the building site until the project was well 
underway. In response, Junior claims to have personally hired Anderson before the residential 
project and to have negotiated the wage to be paid Anderson. However, Junior was unable to 
accurately state Anderson's wage rate. In contrast, Senior was fully aware of Anderson's wage rate. 
Furthermore, nearly all the crew that Senior employed to remodel his storage units also worked on 
Junior's residential project. This supports Anderson's testimony that Senior directed his employees, 
Anderson included, to work on Junior's residence. 
As is customary in construction projects, Anderson provided his own hand tools such as a 
hammer and saw for both the remodel project and the residence project. However. Senior provided 
larger equipment such as an air compressor and air-driven nail guns. Junior provided no equipment 
or tools. 
There is no question that every payment of wages to Anderson was actually made by Senior 
from his ''Kelly Gates Enterprises'' checking account. At first, Senior testified that his payments to 
Anderson were solely an accommodation to Anderson's frequent need for cash and that such 
payments did not include any payments for Anderson's work on Senior's remodeling project. 
However, when confronted by financial records to the contrary, Senior conceded that his payments 
to Anderson represented co-mingled wages for work on the remodeling project and the residential 
project. Junior never paid any wages directly to Anderson, although he did make payments to 
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Senior. It is clear that Anderson always looked directly to Senior, not Junior, for payment of wages. 
Senior was at the work site on a daily basis. Junior was rarely present. Because Anderson 
was an experienced carpenter, he did not require much direction in the actual performance of his 
work. However, Senior felt free to exercise control over Anderson. For example. Senior testified 
he ordered Anderson off the job because Anderson was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
Later in his testimony. Senior attempts to downplay his control by stating that he merely "suggested" 
that Anderson not work. But the Commission concludes that Senior's initial testimony is the most 
accurate statement of Senior's own perception of his authority over Anderson at the work site. The 
Commission also notes that Senior told the workers when to show up for work. Anderson would 
clear his absences from work with Senior. 
After his accident, when it became clear that Anderson required medical care, Anderson 
sought payment from Senior. Senior told Anderson he didn't have any money and directed Anderson 
to make his request to Junior. Then, despite Senior's previous statement that he didn't ha\e any 
money. Senior transferred $1,000 to Junior, who deposited the funds in his own account for use in 
paying some of Anderson's medical expenses. It appears to the Commission that the foregoing 
transfer of funds from Senior to Junior was intended to create some evidence that Junior was 
Anderson's employer. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The sole issue before the Commission is whether Anderson was employed by Senior or by 
Junior. Section 34A-2-104 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act defines an employee as: 
each person in the service of any employer . .. who employs one or more workers or 
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, ... but not including 
any person whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of trade, 
business, or occupation of the employee's employer. 
It is well established that when an employer has retained the right to control the work of a 
workers' compensation claimant, the claimant is the employer's employee for workers' 
compensation purposes. Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427, 429-30 (Utah 1986). 
Among the factors commonly used to determine whether an employer has retained the right of 
control are: 1) the right to direct the performance of the work; 2) the right to hire and fire; 3) 
responsibility for payment of wages; and 4) providing necessary equipment. But these factors are 
not inclusive and no one factor is completely controlling. Johnson Brothers Construction v. Labor 
Commission, 967 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah App. 1998). Ultimately, it is the right to control that is 
determinative. Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah 1984). 
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In applying the foregoing standards to the facts of this case, the Commission notes that 
Anderson was an experienced framer who required little actual direction. However, such direction 
as was required came from Senior, not Junior. Senior hired Anderson and directed whether he would 
work on the storage unit project or the residential construction project. Senior paid Anderson. 
Senior provided such equipment as was necessary to perform the work. In contrast to the pen asive 
control that Senior exercised, Junior exercised little or no control. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Anderson was employed b> Senior 
at the time of his work-related accident and injury. As Anderson's employer, Senior is liable for 
workers' compensation benefits due Anderson on account of his injury. The Commission therefore 
remands this matter to the ALJ to determine the amount of such benefits and for such other action 
necessary to conclude this matter. In light of the length of time that elapsed between the original 
hearing in this matter and the issuance of the ALJ's prior decision, the ALJ is instructed to gi\ e high 
priority to the final resolution of this matter. 
ORDER 
The Commission remands this matter to the ALJ for further proceedings and order consistent 
with this decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this ffi day of June, 2001. 
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GEORGE M ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
KELLY GATES SR. aka KELLE 
GATES SR. (uninsured) and the 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER ON REMAND 
BEFORE: Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
APPEARANCES: George M. Anderson (Anderson, petitioner or applicant) is 
represented by attorney Aaron Prisbrey. 
The respondent, Kelly Gates Sr. (Gates Sr. or respondent) is 
represented by attorney J. MacArthur Wright. 
The Uninsured Employers Fund is represented by attorney Sherrie 
Hayashi. 
In accordance with the 6/28/2001 Order Granting Motion for Review which made new 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Petitioner's 7/02/01 letter summary of 
uncontested evidence (no party having taken issue within 20 days thereafter), the ALJ 
hereby issues the following: 
ORDER ON REMAND 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. shall pay 
Petitioner George M. Anderson temporary total disability compensation at the weekly 
rate of $218.10 for the period from January 17, 1996 through June 1, 1996, a period of 
19.28 weeks for a total of $4,206.28, plus interest at 8 percent per annum from the date 
when each payment would have otherwise been due and payable but less the 
attorney's fee hereinafter awarded. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. shall pay 
Petitioner George M. Anderson permanent partial disability compensation at the weekly 
rate of $218.10 for 31.2 weeks for a 10 percent whole person impairment of his left 
upper extremity for a total of $6,804.72, plus interest at 8 percent annum from June 1, 
1996 but less the attorney's fee hereinafter awarded. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. shall deduct 
attorney's fees from the foregoing temporary total and permanent partial disability 
awards and interest according to the Labor Commission sliding scale and remit those 
fees directly to Petitioner's attorney, Aaron Prisbrey, at his offices. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. shall pay all 
reasonably related and necessary medical expenses incurred as a result of the 
industrial accident of January 17, 1996 specifically including but not limited to bills from 
Dixie Regional Medical Center, Dr. Lawrence Chase and Dr. R. Mark Albright. The 
covered medical expenses are to be paid pursuant to the Relative Value Schedule of 
the Labor Commission, plus interest at 8 percent per annum from the date the services 
were rendered. To avoid the possibility of future litigation and personal liability, Mr. 
Anderson is urged to submit any proposed treatment plan(s) to uninsured employer 
Kelly Gates, Sr., for preauthorization. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund has no liability in this 
matter as there is no proof that uninsured employer Kelly Gates, Sr. is insolvent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the 
specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from 
the date this decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the 
Motion for Review within 20 days of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review 
or its Response. If none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals 
Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
DATED THIS JlJ^fray of July, 2001 
SION 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the J^O^ day of July, 2001, I mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Order on Remand, in the matter of George M. Anderson, postage prepaid to 
the following: 
GEORGE M ANDERSON 195 W MAIN ST ROCKVILLE UT 84763 
KELLE GATES 2306 VINEYARD DR SANTA CLARA UT 84765 
AARON PRISBREY ATTY 135 N 900 E STE 4 ST GEORGE UT 84770 
SHERRIE HAYASHI ATTY UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND 160 E 3RD FL PO BOX 
146612 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6612 (Interoffice Mail) 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Lola Chacon, Support Specialist III 
Adjudication Division 
(801)530-6079 or 1-800-530-5090 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION — 
GEORGE M. ANDERSON, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
KELLY GATES, SR. and 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, 
Defendants. * Case No. 97-0694 
Kelly Gates, Sr. asks the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to review the Labor 
Commission's Order dated June 28, 2001, and the Administrative Law Judge's Order of July 30, 
2001, awarding benefits to George Anderson under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; 
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. Anderson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against Mr. Gates for injuries 
sustained in an accident on January 17,1996. In defense against the claim, Mr. Gates alleged he was 
not Mr. Anderson's employer at the time of the accident. The ALJ initially accepted Mr. Gates' 
argument and denied Mr. Anderson's claim. Mr. Anderson then sought agency review of the ALJ's 
decision. Because neither Mr. Anderson nor Mr. Gates opted to present the motion for review to the 
Appeals Board, the motion for review was considered by Utah Labor Commissioner. 
On June 28, 2001, the Labor Commissioner set aside the ALJ's findings of fact, substituted 
his own findings, and concluded that Mr. Gates was Mr. Anderson's employer at the time of the 
accident. The Commissioner remanded Mr. Anderson's claim to the ALJ to determine the amount 
of benefits due Mr. Anderson. Pursuant to the Commissioner's instruction, the ALJ issued a 
decision on July 30,2001, which merely fixed the amount of medical and disability benefits payable 
on Mr. Anderson's claim. Mr. Gates has now requested Appeals Board review of both the 
Commissioner's decision of June 28, 2001, and the ALJ's decision of July 30, 2001. 
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ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Gates asks the Appeals Board to set aside the Commissioner's decision in this matter and 
reinstate the ALJ's first decision, thereby denying Mr. Anderson's claim and releasing Mr. Gates 
from liability for that claim. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
In essence, Mr. Gates asks the Appeals Board to reverse the decision of the Commissioner 
in this matter and reinstate an earlier decision of the AL J. However, Mr. Gates has not identified any 
statutory authority for the Appeals Board to review decisions of the Commissioner. To the contrary, 
§34A-l-303(2)(b) of the Labor Commission Act provides as follows: 
Unless a parkin interest to the appeal requests in accordance with Subsection (3) that 
the appeal be heard by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. A decision 
of the commissioner is a final order of the commission unless set aside by the court 
of appeals. 
Thus, the only available review of the Commissioner's order is appellate judicial review. 
Unless the Commissioner's order is modified by an appellate court of appropriate jurisdiction, the 
Commissioner's decision is "the law of the case" and is binding with respect to further proceedings 
in this matter. 
ORDER 
Because the Appeals Board has no authority to review a decision of the Labor Commissioner 
and Mr. Gates has raised no other objections to the ALJ's order on remand, the Appeals Board 
affirms the decision of the ALJ dated July 30, 2001, and denies Mr. Gates' motion for review. It is 
so ordered. 
Dated this p day of November, 2001. 
Patricia S. Drawe 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days 
of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals 
by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the 
court within 30 days of the date of this order. 
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